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ABSTRACT 
 
SCENARIOS FOR CYPRUS AFTER THE ANNAN PLAN 
Sütcü, Sulay 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
 
September 2008 
 
 
This master’s thesis aims to introduce a proper understanding of the long-
lasting problems in Cyprus by analyzing the specific elements that shape the 
conflict in the region, starting by giving the historical details of the island. 
Considering similar conflicts that occurred throughout the history and 
previously applied mechanisms in order to manage the problems on the island, 
several scenarios will be presented and discussed to light the way for the best 
settlement of conflicts.  All the way through the study, the method of merging 
comparative and single case studies is adopted and in-dept interviews with the 
former and incumbent presidents of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
iv 
 
(TRNC) are made to supply views of different generations whether non-
recognition of the independence of TRNC have functioned as an impediment 
ahead of conflict resolution. The study is concluded by revealing that the case of 
TRNC fits into the category of ethnic conflict just like the case of Kosovo, hence 
the resolution that will be applied in TRNC shall be very similar to Kosovar 
experience. 
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ÖZET 
 
ANNAN PLANI SONRASI KIBRIS’TA SENARYOLAR 
Sütcü, Sulay 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
 
Eylül 2008 
 
 
Bu yüksek lisans tezinin amacı Kıbrıs’ta uzun zamandır süregelen 
problemleri adanın tarihinden başlayıp bölgedeki anlaşmazlığın özel 
sebeplerini inceleyerek anlamaya çalışmaktır. Adanın tarihi boyunca yaşanmış 
uyuşmazlıkları ve çözüm uygulamalarını dikkate alarak en uygun uzlaşma 
yoluna ulaşabilmek için çeşitli senaryolar sunulacaktır. Çalışma boyunca tek ve 
karşılaştırmalı durum analizleri birarada ele alınmıştır. KKTC’nin 
bağımsızlığının tanınmıyor olmasının uzlaşma sürecinde engel teşkil edip 
etmediğinin farklı nesillerce nasıl yorumlandığını anlamaya yönelik olarak eski 
ve mevcut KKTC cumhurbaşkanları ile görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Son tahlilde 
vi 
 
Kıbrıs’taki durumun Kosova örneğinde olduğu gibi etnik anlaşmazlık 
kategorisinde değerlendirilmesi ve bu değerlendirmenin ışığında adada 
Kosovada uygulanan çözüme benzer bir çözüm yöntemi geliştirilmesi gerektiği 
ortaya çıkmıştır.  
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The conflict in Cyprus1 and problems that stem from the non-recognition 
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus create certain problems in Turkey’s 
relations with its neighbour, Greece, in particular, and with the European Union 
in general. Although, seemingly, all the parties and the interested countries try 
to resolve the conflict, due to the biased formulation of the problem itself and 
the non comprehension of the particular characteristics of the conflict have 
made a settlement almost impossible. There is no question that the perpetuation 
of the conflict affects each side: the economic embargoes hit the Turkish side to 
some extend while the continuation of the conflict makes the division more 
opponent, which in turn affect the Greeks negatively.  The perpetual conflict has 
enhanced the sense of injustice and double standard among the Turks and it has 
                                                 
1
 The word “Cyprus” here refers to a geographical location and not to either one of the states in the island. 
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strengthened the clamour for recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus. As Olgun (2001:1) indicates,  
The international community’s toleration of the Greek Cypriot party’s 
fanatically ethno-nationalistic and unlawful actions and claims has 
resulted in the destruction of balances established on the island 
between Turkey and Greece through the 1960 Agreements. The 
destruction of the power equilibrium and the absence of any 
international effort aimed at restoring this equilibrium are the main 
reasons for the intractability of the Cyprus Question. 
 
Therefore, the already applied mechanisms to manage the conflict in the 
island can be considered as a failure since there is no equal protection and 
representation of the rights of both parties, and under these circumstances, the 
repetition of the conflict and the resumption of violence could not be overlooked 
altogether. In this dissertation, starting with the history of the island, the specific 
elements that shape the conflict in the region will be analyzed, since it has 
become evident that the attempts to resolve the conflict end up with constant 
violation of one part by the other. 
 
History is not without examples of similar conflicts which have to be 
looked at and analyzed very carefully. The main target of this study is to 
introduce such a proper reading by giving both historical details of the island 
and their comparison with other relevant contexts. Therefore, the method that 
will be adopted throughout the present research is the merging of comparative 
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and single case studies. In addition, in-dept interviews were made with Rauf 
Denktaş and Mehmet Ali Talat, the former and incumbent presidents of TRNC 
respectively, in order to compare the views of different generations and see 
whether non-recognition of the independence of TRNC have functioned as a 
strategy of conflict resolution.  
 
The convergence of their interpretation of the Greek side as non-
compromising, biased and continuing enosis policies support the main argument 
of this dissertation, that is, the scenarios that argue for coexistence rather than 
independence will only work for the continuation of the current division the 
island. There is a historical continuity in the attitudes of the Greek side which 
made Turkish intervention necessary in 1974 and, as such, attitudes are 
persistent rather than temporary, as it can be followed from the words of 
Denktaş and Talat, no scenario other than recognition of TRNC can bring about 
a settlement. The interests of one party to the conflict were not being 
represented properly and adequately in the past and they continue be neglected 
at present. As it will be discussed later in detail, different techniques of conflict 
resolution in similar contexts have been adopted by those who do not recognize 
TRNC as an independents state, namely, there is a contradiction that to which 
more attention needs to be paid in order for an effective and more manageable 
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conflict resolution formula to be created. Given the fact that over the last decade 
or two a number of partnership states i.e. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and 
others, have been dismantled and each partner set up its own internationally 
recognized state, it is apparent that nothing short of the international 
recognition for TRNC will work. It is this contradiction that is one of the main 
problematics of this thesis, and that is visible in the continuous suffering of the 
Turkish side in the island. It is interesting to note that both Denktaş and Talat 
supporters of diameterically opposed views in terms of a settlement to the 
conflict have alluded to that contradiction, the crux of this dissertation, a 
number of times during their seperate interviews.  
 
The dissertation will start off by giving details about the history of the 
context and how the relations between the conflicting groups have been 
characterized. In the detailed study of the history of conflict in Cyprus, the 
relevant variables that have to be taken into consideration to test the effectivity 
of possible scenarios will be identified. This conflict in the island will then be 
tested in terms of whether it fits the category of ethnic conflict or not as it had 
been introduced by Wolff (2004) in his article “Managing and Settling Ethnic 
Conflicts”. The importance of Wolff’s categorization is that he introduces the 
possibility of various types of conflicts which simultaneously means the 
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necessity of coming up with different techniques of dealing with each. He 
argues that what makes ethnic conflicts uniqe is that ethnic differences 
themselves become the source of contradiction and violence, that is, one ethnic 
groups’ safety and dignity are constrantly denied and violated. Therefore, the 
conflict resolution techniques to be introduced have to be structured in a way 
that both parties are equally protected and represented.  
 
In ethnic conflicts, compared to other types of conflicts, the consequences 
of insisting on a scenario that supports coexistence rather than independence are 
not structered as such and end up with continuous discrimination of one group. 
Thus, such a technique is not effective enough to guarantee that the chances that 
the conflict among the groups will be repeated are minimal. In this study, after 
giving a brief background about the history of the island and the relations 
among two groups in conflcit, a particular chapter will be devoted to the Annan 
Plan and to discuss whether such a criterion would be effective. The main 
conclusion that is derived from such an analysis of the Annan Plan is that the 
Annan Plan fails to answer the needs of the region to end the conflict. 
 
The above-mentioned part of the dissertation is mainly based upon a 
detailed single case study which will mainly function to identify the main 
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problematics, according to which strength of a scenario to end the conflict in the 
region has to be tested. The Annan Plan, its failures and the attitudes of the two 
parties during the process of developing such a plan had also been very 
functional in terms of clarifying the main sources of conflict.  
 
In the following part of the dissertation, the importance of the necessity to 
introduce different conflict resolution techniques that will meet different needs 
and demands will be stressed by the introduction of three cases of the conflict 
which are Kosovo, Montenegro and the ‘velvet divorce’ between Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. The main characteristics of conflict in those different 
cases will be identified as it had been done to the case of Cyprus and how these 
conflicts had been settled will be briefly considered. 
 
Each case will be concluded by a discussion about whether the conflict 
settlement technique adapted there is applicable to the Cyprus question. The 
Kosovo case will be argued as the one that is providing the best scenario that 
will fit into the particularities of the nature of conflict in Cyprus, and hence 
recognition of independent status of TRNC will be argued to be the most viable 
and non-biased conflict management strategy. Since these two cases show 
significant parallels, TRNC has the right to demand the recognition of 
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independence that simultneously followed Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence.   
 
The main issue that makes the other scenarios inapplicable is that they are 
structured to deal with the conflicts that are non ethnic in nature. In case of 
Montenegro, there was not much of an ethnic difference among the groups in 
conflict and in Czechoslovakia, the main sources of conflict was rather economic 
than ethnic. The discussion will be concluded by summarizing the findings of 
the single and comparative case studies which support the present thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1. A Brief Historical Background Before 1960 
 
Throughout the history, questions over Cyprus were never cleared. Apart 
from the Lusignan domination (1192-1489) on the island, there was no 
indication of unity on the island. The island continuously got under different 
regional powers which varied very much from each other. In other words, 
control of different religions, social structures gradually created a complex 
formation for the newly arriving rulers (Manisali, 2000:5).  
 
In chronological order, ancient Egyptians took control over the island in 
1450 B.C, then the island came under Hittites rule in 1320 B.C, then stage by 
stage the island again fell under Egyptian rule followed by Phoenicians, 
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Assyrians, Independent Kingdoms, Egyptians, Persians, Macedon, and 
Egyptians again. Following these, Romans invaded the island in 59 B.C and took 
control of it till A.C 395. Then in order, Byzantines, Frankish Crusaders, 
Lusignans and Venetians were in control of the island (Serter and Fikretoğlu, 
2002:12). Afterwards, in 1571 the Ottomans took over in the island (Zaim, 
1981:1) and till 1878 they ruled it. Ottoman rule was welcomed since previous 
owners of the island; Catholic Venetians put pressure on Orthodox Christians 
(Manisali, 2000:5). After the Ottoman rule in 1878, the island was transferred to 
British control and with the Treaty of Lausanne2, Britain’s sovereignty on the 
island was recognized by Turkey. Greek Cypriots brutal struggle for liberation 
and enosis3 eventually ended the British rule over the island and brought the 
peoples of the island to today’s congested conflict in Cyprus (Akalın, 1999:199). 
The attempt of Britain to draw back from Cyprus in a sense created a vacuum of 
power and eventually the Greek Cypriot attempt to unite Cyprus with Greece, a 
process named enosis began to take shape. The campaigning of enosis by the 
                                                 
2
 Article 20: Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government 
on the 5th November, 1914.                                                                                                                   
Article 21: Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire   
British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their 
Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years 
from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months 
after having so opted. Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the 
present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality, in 
consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish 
nationality. It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British 
nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another 
nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government. 
3
 Union with Greece. 
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Greeks resulted in violence and deaths of many people and with the rise of 
Makarios to Archbishop Status, claims for enosis became even more provoking. 
 
In response pronounced and Turkish Cypriots’ identification with Turkey 
had became more powerful. All these developments intensified with the 
establishment of a Greek terrorist organization named EOKA – National 
Organization of Cypriot Fighters- where EOKA engaged in operations against 
both British rule and Turkish Cypriots. In January 1954, with the economic 
support of Makarios, explosive materials and weapons were brought to the 
island after the decision of Struggle Committee of EOKA to attain enosis 
(Drusotis, 2002:51). In order to stand against the enosis policy of EOKA, Turkish 
Cypriots promoted taksim4, which meant partition of the island and formed the 
Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). EOKA engaged in operations against 
British rule, Turkish Cypriots and organized attacks on armed services 
(Drusotis, 2002:102).  
 
In other words, the picture in the island was full of violence and tension 
which rose and took a nature of Greek-Turkish civil war, instead of a struggle 
                                                 
4
 Partition of the island into a Turkish and a Greek state. 
11 
 
between Greeks and British (Hale, 2002:131). To sum up, the EOKA terror 
((Serter and Fikretoğlu, 2002:84) 
 
• Attacked 30 Turkish villages, 
• Murdered 200 Turkish people, 
• Injured approximately 1000 Turkish People, 
• Made 5000 bomb attacks, 
• Materialized roughly 3000 sabotages 
 
2.2. 1960s; the Making and Destruction of the Partnership State 
 
The disorder in the island led many diplomats to consider the creation of 
an independent state in Cyprus, which came out with trilateral, London and 
Zurich Agreements (1959). The ‘Republic of Cyprus’5 came forth as a result of 
these agreements between three regional players (UK, Turkey and Greece) in 
addition to domestic ones. The newly established Republics’ President would be 
represented by a Greek Cypriots whereas Vice-Presidency would belong to a 
Turkish Cypriot which would be elected by respective communities. The 
Council of Ministers would be conceived of 7 Greek and 3 Turkish ministers and 
                                                 
5
 The internationally recognized “Cyprus” is the Greek Cypriot administration in the south of the island, 
which claims to be the sole representative in the name of the whole island in the international arena. 
12 
 
the same percentage proportion would be kept in the legislation process and in 
civil services. In the affairs of foreign policy, security and defence, both 
representatives of the two sides would have a right of veto. 
 
According to this agreement, the Turkish Cypriot community obtained 
political equality with the Greek Cypriot community, and based on the Treaty of 
Guarantee, Turkey, Greece and the UK were responsible for the maintenance of 
the constitutional order over the island. In addition to these, UK obtained two 
base areas: Dhekelia and Akrotiri, Greece and Turkey after negotiated 
proportion, were to place troops on the island (Article 1 and 10 of the Treaty of 
Establishment). 
 
With the Treaty of Guarantee (Article 1), the two sides agreed “not to 
participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any 
State whatsoever”. And finally and importantly, in case provisions were 
violated, the Treaty of Guarantee (Article 4) gave the right to the three guarantor 
powers, to “take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs 
created by the present Treaty”. In short, as the Article 1 of the Treaty suggests, 
this agreement aimed to prevent the island both from enosis and taksim. 
  
13 
 
However, the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ did not last very long. Firstly, problems 
aroused between the two sides on issues such as separate municipalities, 
Constitutional Court, representation problem in civil services, proportion in the 
military and on taxation (Serter and Fikretoğlu, 2002:132). Meanwhile, the Greek 
Cypriot Interior Minister Policarpos Yorgadjis, including President Makarios, 
and Chairman of Assembly, Glafkos Kleridis, were preparing the Akritas Plan. 
The Plan contents were conceived of ways of achieving enosis and destruction of 
the Turks in the island6. Being the leader of the Greek Cypriots, Archbishop 
Makarios, as his name suggests, was always a ‘Greek nationalist’ and a 
‘churchman’, and worked systematically for campaigning of enosis (Stavrinides, 
1976:25). 
 
With respect to these, in August 1963, President Makarios declared 13 
points to amend the Constitution (Stavrinides, 1976:4), all of which aimed to 
reduce the Turkish Cypriots’ gained rights to minority rights (Dodd, 2004:2). 
Since, with the 1960 Constitution, Turkish Cypriots had equal status with Greek 
Cypriots, which was realized by having the equal power of veto to either side’s 
representatives, the Greek community demanded the withdrawal of Turkish 
                                                 
6
 For further information, see http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/akritas_plan.htm 
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Cypriot community from the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ by proposing abolishment of 
right of veto of Vice President. 
 
Towards the end of 1963, Greek Cypriots increased brutal systematic 
attacks against Turkish Cypriots. On 1 January 1964, Makarios declared that he 
unilaterally abolished the 1960 Agreements. Thus the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ 
found itself in a civil war in December 1963. In the meantime, in order to stop 
violations, the United Nations sent in UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus) to the island which was to prevent resumption of hostilities 
and act as an interposition force in order to convince the parties through 
negotiations regarding the unity, territorial integrity and political independence 
of Cyprus (Karaosmanoğlu, 2002:107). 
 
UNFICYP became fully operational on 27 March 1964 with the 
contribution of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
Britain. 6200 troops were complimented. In fact, neither the individual state 
actors nor NATO and UN were prepared and capable to activate conflict 
prevention mechanisms before the civil war erupted in 1963. The reactions were 
followed only after exceeding threshold of violence. As of March 4, 1964, UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 186 authorizing the formation of the 
15 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and intermediary 
assistance to the communities in the conflict. UNFICYP’s mandate, as given in 
resolution 186 (1964) was to use its best efforts to7: 
- Prevent a recurrence of fighting 
- Contribute to the maintenance of restoration of law and order 
- Contribute to a return to normal conditions 
 
Despite the fact that the UN achieved a considerable progress on the first two 
objectives, contribution to a return to normal conditions remained in question. 
 
2.3. 1974 Turkish Intervention8 and Partition 
 
An important aspect of Zurich-London Agreements is the article four 
which gives the right to three guaranteeing powers to take action with the sole aim 
of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty9. The Greek Junta 
forces, organized a coup d’état against the Greek Cypriot government on July 15, 
                                                 
7
 For further information see www.unficyp.org 
8
 Here, for academic purposes, the neutral term “intervention” is used, but the same event is perceived and 
labeled by the Greek/Greek Cypriot side as “occupation”, while by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side as a 
“peace operation”. 
9
 Article 4 of 1960 treaty: “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures 
necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. 
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers 
reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the 
present Treaty 
16 
 
1974, to overthrow Makarios and declare enosis with Greece. With the refusal of 
Britain to intervene, Turkey acting on the Treaty of Guarantee intervened solely 
to prevent Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus from enosis (Dodd, 2004:4). As a result 
of this intervention, Turkish Cypriots’ security was obtained. Turkish Cypriot 
community, after 1963 Greek assaults, in order to self determinate itself, 
constituted a General Committee and then formed a ‘temporary Turkish 
administration’ and ‘Turkish Administration’.  Soon after 1974 ‘peace operation’ 
was accomplished, lines were drawn between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and 
an Exchange of Population Agreement was concluded in Vienna in 1975. With 
the supervision of UN, Turkish population was exchanged with Greeks and vice 
versa. The Turks moved to the northern part of the island and Greeks to the 
south. Wide range of an immigration process started. However, the Turkish 
Cypriot administration was facing difficulties in managing the Turkish-held 
areas which were dispersed all over the island. With the state of political 
situation, the Turkish Cypriot Administration was converted to ‘Autonomous 
Turkish Cypriot Administration’ (Serter and Fikretoğlu, 2002:199). All these 
were results of the Greek Cypriot’s preventing Turkish Cypriots to use its own 
rights obtained with the 1960 Constitution. Turkish Cypriots were forced to live 
under threats and pressures in order to safeguard their own security. Between 
1963-67 and 1974, as being one of the founders, they resisted the threats and 
17 
 
attempts of ending the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. With the belief of the only way that 
could supply peace, comfort, and security is to live nearby but to constitute their 
own structures.  The proposals of forming an ‘Independent Cyprus Federal 
Republic’ were rejected by the Greek Cypriot community. And later on, with the 
decision of Assembly of ‘Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration’, on 
February 13, 1975, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was proclaimed by 
Turkish Cypriots. 
 
2.4. 1980s 
 
Obviously, there were talks to bring the two communities together. High 
Level Agreements between Denktaş and Makarios in 1977 and between Denktaş 
and Kyprioanou in 1979 were conducted aiming establishment of a federation. 
In 1977 summit, Denktaş and Makarios signed a 4-point agreement which 
included an agreement on bi-communal ‘federal republic’, equality, return of 
refugees and territory issues. With the death of Makarios, these talks took a 
break and later on with some other pauses, his successor Kyprioanou resumed 
the talks. A ten point agreement was signed between Denktaş and Kyprioanou 
in 1979 taking 1977 agreement as a base. However talks took some pauses and 
18 
 
later on Greek Cypriots presented some proposals which contrasted with the 
Turkish proposals and the 1977 agreement.  
 
Since no result came of these talks, on November 15th, 1983, Turkish 
Cypriots unilaterally declared the formation of Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC). Today, in the international arena, only the Greek government 
is recognized as the whole representative of ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and Turkey 
solely recognizes the Turkish government, TRNC. In consequence, the division 
of the two communities has remained since 1974. With the help of Turkey, 
TRNC was able to form a government based on democracy, and full working 
institutions of a state. 
 
Turkish Cypriots mainly insisted on the need to be treated equal as the 
Greek Cypriots, and based their claims on the fact that they were unjustly 
treated by the Western powers, which in general favoured the Greeks. Whereas 
the Greek Cypriots based their claims on their proportional superiority, the 1960 
Constitutions treated them unjustly (Dodd, 2004:5). 
 
The Greek Cypriot explanation on the Cyprus problem is that it started in 
1974, with Turkey’s intervention in the island. This intervention is perceived by 
19 
 
the Greeks as an “invasion” (Stavridis, 2002:1). The Greek Cypriot leadership 
states to international community that the Turkish Cypriots on the island are 
‘minority’, and the whole island is a Greek land. According to them, in any 
settlement, the Turkish Cypriots should not have excess rights; they should only 
have minority rights. 
 
2.5. Developments in the 1990s and the EU Involvement in Cyprus 
 
Even tough the EU imported Cyprus Conflict to its agenda before 1990, 
through Greece’s membership in 1981, EU became directly involved as an actor 
more recently with the membership application of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ to 
the Union in 1990. Despite the objections from TRNC and Turkey, the EU dealt 
with the Greek government as the legitimate government of ‘Republic of 
Cyprus’. 
 
Unfortunately, in exchange of Greek veto on Turkey’s establishing a 
Customs Union with the EU, the government in Turkey under prime minister 
Tansu Çiller made a move towards agreement on Cyprus’ start of accession 
negotiations, which was regarded by some opposition parties in Turkey and 
Turkish Cypriots as being ‘sold out’ (Dodd, 2004:9). 
20 
 
 
EU’s effect as a catalyst for a solution has been a subject of discussion. In 
addition, when the negotiations started between EU and ‘Republic of Cyprus’, 
the foreign minister of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’, Ioannis Kasoulides, argued that 
these negotiations would act as a ‘catalyst’ for a solution to the Cyprus Question 
(Diez, 2002:3). Even though the EU did not declare unification of Cyprus as a 
pre-requisite to joining the Union, the EU always made clear its preference for 
the accession of a united Cyprus (European Council in Helsinki in 1999). While 
the EU was not party to the negotiations between two communities, it declared 
its support to UN’s efforts of finding a compromise to the two communities’ 
problems. Here, it could be argued that the fact that only one side needed this 
settlement made it harder in reaching a compromise. Despite its straightness, in 
Helsinki European Council 1999, ‘Republic of Cyprus’ was accepted as a 
member without any condition for a solution, which erased the hopes for a 
negotiated settlement. 
 
It could also be argued that another turning point that complicated the 
relations between the two communities was this application of the Greek 
administration for EU membership on behalf of Cyprus as a whole. According 
to article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee it was clear that each community 
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should “not participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union 
with any State whatsoever”. The Turks based their claims on this fact that 1960 
Constitution was still in force, so they had no legal or moral right to take this 
action (Stephen, 2001:130). Although the Turkish Cypriot community opposed 
the application of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ by the Greek Cypriot in the name of 
the whole island, the EU had accepted to evaluate it. After years of discussion, it 
was scheduled for Cyprus to sign accession treaty on the 16th of April 2003 and 
formally become an EU member on the 1st of May 2004. The hope was that 
significant progress could be made in drawing up an agreement before that 
date. 
 
With the EU factor, a rapid transformation in the Turkish Cypriot society 
has occurred. The views in the country became divided into two. Those who 
followed Denktaş evaluated the Annan Plan as an obstacle to the independence 
of Turkish Cypriot side. The supporters of the Annan Plan, on the other hand, 
saw the Annan Plan as a route to the EU membership, which would end their 
isolation and solve their economic troubles. Claims among the EU, UN and USA 
to reward TRNC for their positive attitudes towards the conflict resolution 
process by lifting the international embargoes, isolation, enabling direct flights 
to the Turkish Cypriot airport Ercan and the opening of the ports to 
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international trade and the recognition of Turkish Cypriot Universities, had the 
strongest affect on the public opinion. 
 
Large demonstrations took place in which about one-third of the 
population participated. In addition to these, media played and important role 
in the phase of the negotiations. Media’s role was a noteworthy one especially in 
the Turkish Cypriot civil society. In general, the media presented Denktaş as an 
obstacle to a possible solution and to the well-being of Turkish Cypriots. In 
short, in TRNC, the media funded mostly by the outsiders, favoured a solution 
on the basis of the Annan Plan. 
 
The press in Turkey generally evaluated a compromise which could be 
reached with the Annan Plan, as a good development for Turkey which would 
positively influence Turkey-EU relations. In addition, the international press put 
pressure on both sides to make them accept in the Annan Plan. 
 
The polarisation of the Turkish society can be explained by another 
dynamic in addition to EU and the Media factor. Turkey’s change of almost 40 
years policy on Cyprus could be considered as one of them. Turkey is one of the 
main actors of the conflict in the island in addition to the two Cypriot 
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communities. Turkey mainland forces are located in the northern part of the 
island since 1974 to guarantee safety of Turkish Cypriots. Secondly, Turkey is 
the only state that recognizes TRNC. In other words, Turkey’s role in the conflict 
is the role of a caring motherland. Turkish foreign policy makers often declare 
the Cyprus issue to be considered in Turkey’s vital strategic and national 
interest. While dealing with the Cyprus issue, Turkey is following an essentially 
realistic approach.  
 
The precedent, which left behind with several bad memories, a lack of trust 
and a sense of fear, the massacres made by the EOKA guerillas to the Turkish 
community in Cyprus are often bared in mind. However after the general 
elections in Turkey in 2002, which resulted the victory of government lead by 
Tayyip Erdoğan, policies towards the Cyprus issue softened and in fact, 
intentions to put weight for solving the Cyprus problem along the line of the 
Annan Plan was set forward. It is obvious that the EU plays significant role in 
views of AKP10 government seeing as its key aim in order to begin to the EU 
accession process.  
 
                                                 
10
 AKP is the abbreviation for -moderately Islamist- Justice and Development Party.  
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Apart from the EU element, another motive that pushed policies of AKP 
government in favor of Annan plan was the Loizidou Case, which obliged 
Turkey to pay thousands of dollars. There are thousands of applications like 
that and if the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) continues such cases, 
Turkey would have to pay billions of Euros to the Greek Cypriot people who 
left their territories in North side after 1974. So, after the changes in the 
government, views of different groups divided on the Cyprus issue. The 
opponents of the Annan Plan share the view that the Cyprus issue would be 
defended and Turkey should continue to support TRNC rather than putting 
pressure on it to reach a solution. Cyprus is strategically important, with 
recognized Cyprus; Turkey would have an effective role in the Middle East and 
on oil lines. Apart from these, there is an interesting point that neither Turkey 
nor TRNC in their policies explicitly stated that TRNC should be recognized. 
Almost no action was undertaken towards the international independence of 
TRNC. They are basing their arguments on the basis of 1960 Constitutional state. 
 
In short, compared to the Southern part, there was no co-operation among 
the Turks regarding the ‘target’. Although the common target is claimed to be 
the solution, there have been considerable differences on what this solution is 
like or how this solution can be accomplished. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
UN ENGAGEMENT IN CYPRUS AND THE ANNAN PLAN 
 
 
3.1. UN Engagement 
 
In the efforts of finding a compromise between the two communities in the 
island, the United Nations has been the main actor. Since 1960s, the Cyprus 
conflict has been on the agenda of the United Nations. 
 
At first, UNFICYP’s task was to act as an interposition force between 
communities to prevent the spread of violence across the island and open the 
way for a peaceful settlement between the two communities. After 1974, 
UNFICYP’s task was transformed into monitoring of the cease-fire and the 
buffer zone between Northern Cyprus and Southern Cyprus. UNFICYP was 
entrusted with the task of contributing to the status quo and the prevention of 
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resumption of fighting. It was intended to deploy for only 3 months but it has 
still been in place today. Although UNFICYP was not able to make a big 
progress in the island in the name of conflict resolution, it has made successful 
work in preventing the escalation of inter-communal conflict from and arranged 
ceasefires. Except for a few incidents, no inter-communal violence has occurred 
on the island since 1974. 
 
United Nation’s involvement in the Cyprus conflict as a third party is not 
limited to its peacekeeping function. Negotiations concerning the search for a 
solution to the conflict have been going on mainly under the auspices of the 
United Nations. UN efforts are concentrated for preparing the ground for direct 
negotiations in order to achieve a viable political solution of the Cyprus conflict. 
Starting from the Secretary General U-Thant’s efforts as early as 1964, UN has 
intervened most extensively as a mediator. For years, various Secretary Generals 
chaired the negotiations on a new constitution for the divided island of Cyprus 
however, till now; no settlement has been arrived at. 
 
Recent negotiations concerning a solution to the conflict has also been 
going primarily with the support of the United Nations. Proximity talks were 
carried out from December 1999 till November 2000 and direct talks were 
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carried out from January 2002 to February 2003. During this period, third 
parties, namely the US, UK, the EU and UN intensified their efforts in order to 
reach a feasible solution for the Cyprus issue before the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ 
became member to the EU. 
 
3.2. UN Attempts 
 
In 1977, for the first time since 1974, Archbishop Makarios and President 
Denktaş’s met to find a mid-way solution. According the president of Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), Denktaş’s proposal, on 27th January 1977, 
Denktaş-Makarios summit took place. Following this meeting on 12th February 
1977 another summit including the term General Secretary of UN, Kurt 
Waldheim, took place. In this summit Denktaş and Makarios agreed on four 
articles. There are two important components of this agreement, Firstly; A bi-
communal ‘federal republic’ the structure of the state and the constitutional 
system would be arranged according to this federal system structure. Secondly, 
the territorial arrangements would depend on economic sufficiency or 
productivity, and property rights. In other words, the negotiations reached a 
compromise where political status, equality, return of refugees and territory 
issues were agreed upon by the parties. However, with the death of Makarios, a 
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break was applied to the negotiations till May 1979. As being his successor, 
Sypros Kyprianou took over the inter-communal negotiations. An agreement 
was signed between the inter-communal negotiators. This agreement was a 
developed version of 1977 Denktaş-Makarios agreements. A ten-point 
agreement which included territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority 
on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, demilitarization of Cyprus, 
depending on mutual trust and good intentions was signed by both parties. The 
talks took breaks due to the regime changes and political changes in Turkey and 
Greece. 
 
The talks continued and on August 1981, Turkish Cypriots presented their 
fundamental principles: a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic, equality, fifty-
fifty ratio on all government institutions and restriction of freedoms of 
movement, property and settlements according to the 1977 plan11. 
 
The Greek proposals compared to the Turkish one and to the 1977 
Agreements, had great differences. They insisted on a unitary state, undividable 
territory of the federal republic and usage of the federal legislative and 
                                                 
11
 For further information see http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/59.htm 
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executive powers to ensure Cyprus's economic reintegration. However no 
advances were reached with these talks.  
 
According to the developments, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus on the 15th of November 1983. With the efforts of 
the term Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, ‘indirect negotiations’ started in 
New York in 1984.  After three round of talks, UN Secretary-General Perez de 
Cuella’s mediation mission was rejected by the Greek part became de Cuella’s 
proposed plan envisaged a federal, bi-communal, and bi-zonal constitution. The 
Greek Cypriot’s red lines, stated by the terms of the Greek Cypriot President 
Sypros Kyprioanou were mainly based on the withdrawal of Turkish forces 
from the island, return of Turkish settlers who had come from Turkey after 1974 
and the freedom of movement, resident and property ownership on the island 
(Dodd, 2004:6). 
 
In 1988, Yorgos Vasiliu won the presidential elections of the Greek 
administration. Bilateral talks between Vasiliu and TRNC President Denktaş 
continued from 1988 September to 1989 summer. After these negotiations, in 
February 1990, Denktaş and Vasiliu came together again in New York. 
However, these negotiations were also abandoned like previous ones, as Vasiliu 
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did not agree on Turkish Cypriot rights; having a seperate identity and right to 
self determination that Denktaş insisted.  
 
In 1992, the term UN Secretary-General Butros Ghali, brought the leaders 
of the two sides together again in New York.  During the first tour of the 
negotiations, the General Secretary Ghali exposed a map that only left 28.2% of 
land to Turkish side. This map which also suggested to give Omorpho to the 
Greek administration, was rejected by Denktaş who stated 29% (+)  as the 
minimum rate that he can accept. The second tour of the meetings started on the 
15th of July. In this tour Butros Ghali presented a resolution plan to both sides 
that is also named as ‘Set of Ideas’.  This plan was based on Peres de Cuealla’s 
plan, however the negotiations could not make any progress on the matters of 
property and residency. Despite all these, Turkish Cypriots accepted the first 
plan, whereby the Greeks rejected (Dodd, 2004:7). 
 
3.3. The Annan Plan 
 
The most effective and famous efforts of UN came with the Annan Plan. 
On November 11, 2002, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, presented 
a comprehensive plan for the leaders of the parties namely direct to the Greek 
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Cypriot leader President Glafcos Kleridis and Turkish Cypriot President Rauf 
Denktaş, and the plan was made public upon presentation.  
 
The Annan Plan was a combination of former UN attempts over the years 
in order to promote a settlement to the significant problems dividing the sides, 
such as decreasing the amount of the Turkish military presence on the island 
which was perceived as a threat by the Greek Cypriots, finding mid-ways to the 
problems which became complicated after 1974, bringing arrangements to 
territory and property claims of each side, creation of equal status within the 
agreed context of bi-communal federation. 
 
The first Annan Plan, having 150 pages, was presented to the concerning 
states on 11 November 2002. The Annan Plan expected to prepare grounds for 
direct negotiations in order to achieve a feasible resolution to the Cyprus 
conflict.  
 
Presidents of the two parties engaged in discussions, however negotiations 
broke off too many times. Annan Plan revised five times and finally the plan 
was offered to public referendum. The final version of the plan was presented 
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by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Parties on 21 March 2004, 
in Burgenstock, Switzerland. 
 
Just before the Greek Cypriot entrance to the EU, the final Annan Plan was 
voted in separate referenda by the two administrations. The results showed that 
a significant share of the Turkish Cypriot population (64.90%) was in favour of 
the resolution on the basis of the Annan Plan, while the majority of the Greek 
Cypriots (75.83%) voted no. 
 
3.4. Analysis of the UN Plan 
 
In its main articles, the Annan Plan confirms that Cyprus belongs to both 
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and reminds that both sides were the 
partners of the established state in 1960. In addition to these, the Plan aims to 
guarantee that the past events will not repeat and intents to build a relationship 
based on political equality (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: Main articles of the 
Foundation Agreement). 
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3.4.1. Basic Articles 
 
 According to the UN Plan, “United Cyprus Republic is an independent 
and sovereign state with a single international legal personality and a federal 
government and consists of two constituent states, namely the Greek Cypriot 
State and the Turkish Cypriot State” (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: Foundation 
Agreement, Article:1). 
 
3.4.2. The Common State: 
 
The common states’ legislative power would be formed by two parts; the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Among each constituting states equal 
number of Senators will be represented whereas Chamber of Deputies would be 
formed according to proportion of population. On the other hand, the chair 
number of each constituting states will not be less than ¼ of the total chair 
number (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, Article: 5, 
par.1). 
 
Being a part of Federal Parliament, in the Chamber of Deputies, deputies 
would participate according to the ratio of population, however the number of 
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deputies which would be chosen by northern part shall be at least 1/3 
proportion. In other words, Federal Parliament would have 12 representatives 
from north and 36 representatives from south. (The Annan Plan, articles 10-22) 
 
Decisions made by the Common State depend on both chambers 
proportion of simple majority. On some certain matters, voted by Senators, 2 out 
of 5 special majority would be taken into consideration (The Annan Plan, 
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, Article: 5, par.1b ). 
 
The executive power of the Common state would be exercised by the 
Presidential Council. It would constitute of 6 members chosen from single list 
through special majority of Senate and should be approved by majority of 
Chamber of Deputies. 
 
Distribution of membership of Presidential Council would be made 
according to the proportion of population of each constituting state. It is desired 
that decisions would be taken according to majority. But in case where majority 
could not be achieved, unless specified in another way, with at least one 
participant from each constituent state decision would be taken by simple 
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majority (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, Article: 5, 
par.2b). 
 
The members of Council have equal voting rights and the Council shall 
decide the distribution of departments between its members. The heads of 
departments of external relations and EU relations should not be presented by 
the same constituent state (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: Foundation 
Agreement, Article: 5, par.2c). 
 
President and Vice-president of the Council will be chosen among Council 
members for a 10 month period. And in addition to this, neither the President 
nor the Vice-president would have a veto-right (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: 
Foundation Agreement, Article: 5, par.2d). 
 
“The Central Bank of Cyprus, the Office of the Attorney-General and the 
Office of the Auditor-General shall be independent” (The Annan Plan, 
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, Article: 5, par.3). 
 
The Supreme Court will constitute equal number of judges from each 
constituent state and three non-Cypriot judges (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: 
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Foundation Agreement, Article: 6, par.2). And it shall, inter alia manage the 
relationship between the common state and the constituent state. 
 
In short, the common state would be in charge of external relations and EU 
relations, in addition to monetary policy, currency, Central bank regulations, 
budget, indirect taxations, economic and commercial policies, meteorology, 
aviation, international navigation, continental shelf, territorial waters, water 
resources, national resources12, citizenship, communications, struggle for 
terrorism, drug smuggling, and other organized crimes, would be under the 
responsibility of the Common State- within the boundaries of the Constitution 
(Efegil, 2003:26-27).  
 
3.4.3. The Constituent States 
 
         In the first two versions of the Annan Plan, status of the states’ were 
defined with the term ‘component state’, which was never used before for 
organic structures like federation and confederation on judicial grounds 
(Toluner, 2003:30). In addition ‘sovereignty’ of these “component states” was 
defined with the term ‘sovereignly’ (The Annan Plan, p.8, article 2, par.1c) 
                                                 
12
 Based on the modification of the first Annan Plan , natural and water resources were included under the 
authority of the Common State. 
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instead of ‘sovereignty’. This kind of a statement does not express a meaning for 
the international law (Sönmezoğlu, 2003:11). In the last version of the Plan, the 
expression of ‘component state’ was changed with the term ‘constituent state’. 
 
As emphasized earlier, the UN Plan, offered two ‘constituent states’ and a 
‘common state’. Like the Belgian system, constituent and common states “were 
not placed in a hierarchical relationship” (Dodd, 2004:8). The constituent states 
would be free to exercise their own authority and functions that the Constitution 
did not took in charge of the common state, within the boundaries of the 
Constitution. Some of these functions were comprised of; tourism, industry, 
agriculture, fishery, trade, sports, education, health, labor etc. 
 
3.4.4. Security and Demilitarization 
         
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee would stay in force mutatis mutandis to the 
new state of affairs (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, 
Article: 8, par.1). This seems that the article gives the right to Greece, Turkey 
and United Kingdom to act together if possible, guarantee that the security 
functions are fulfilled. Turkey’s guarantee can be considered as a vital interest 
for the Turkish Cypriots. Despite this reality, Turkey’s status as a guarantor 
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would become non- proccessable (The Annan Plan, p.12, Article 8, par.1.) due to 
the indefiniteness of the guarantee system (Toluner, 2003:30).  
 
The Turkish contingent shall be reduced from 30.000 to 6.000 till 2011, and 
gradually within 10 years should not exceed 650 ranks (The Annan Plan, p.12, 
Article 8, par.1b).  Since demilitarization of the island leaves 650 Turkish, 950 
Greek troops and two British military bases, these troops will be settled in each 
constituent state’s respective areas (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: Foundation 
Agreement, Article: 8, par.1). UNFICYP shall act as a monitoring power through 
the implementation of this agreement. In addition to demilitarization, 
exportation of weapon was prohibited (The Annan Plan, Appendix A: 
Foundation Agreement, Article: 8, par.2). 
 
With respect to these, upon the demand of Greek Cypriot government, 
United Nations shall be responsible of the security all over the island (Efegil, 
2003:31). The common state and the constituent states would be able to posses 
their own police organizations. Common State’s police will be formed with 
equal number of personnel from each constituent state (The Annan Plan, 
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement, Article: 15, par.3). 
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3.4.5. Territorial Adjustments: 
 
In the Annan Plan, according to Cyprus Map A: Turkish-held area will be 
decreased from 37 % to 28 %. Therefore, with the Annan Map, 23% of the TRNC 
territory shall be given to the Greek Cypriots. The fertile area of Guzelyurt 
(Morphou) was included too. In addition to this, 10% of the total territorial area 
or houses, and 20% of municipality or territorial area in villages or 20% of the 
houses shall be given to Greek Cypriots. Adding up to these, Karpaz region, old 
Maronite villages and church domains approximately containing 60.000 acre 
shall be returned to Greek Cypriots. As a result, Turkish Cypriots living in the 
northern Cyprus would only preserve the territories that are registered with a 
title deed to Turkish Cypriots.  
 
With respect to the territorial regulations the plan sets a Relocation Board 
in order to control and coordinate the vacation and replacement of the current 
inhabitants with respect to keeping a balance the people in charge by the ratios 
of the population (The Annan Plan, Annex 6, article 7). The Plan aims to provide 
some financial support for Cypriots who are not capable of meeting the 
demands of relocation. In addition, for people who are not Cypriots citizens, 
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again financial support would be supplied for their returns (The Annan Plan, 
Annex 6, article 5). 
 
Approximately 200.00 Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot immigrant 
would apply to demand from the Relocation Commission. The Commission will 
not make a statement till 90% decision is made. (The Annan Plan, p.146. article 
13). Therefore trials will start for years. Here it can be argued that this solution 
would in fact lead to more conflicts.  
In short, the lands that Turkish Cypriots shall abandon contain 70% fertile 
lands and 70% of the water resources. These losses would create a shock on 
TRNC’s economy, since it constitutes 18% of the national income (Hisarcıkoğlu, 
2003:6).  
 
3.4.6. Property 
 
With regard to land property claims, a Property Board was mandated to 
deal with and find a solution to the real owners of the properties before 1974. As 
an exception, religious sites, areas under military usage and properties used for 
public benefit were out of question for compensation. 
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Exchange, reinstatement, compensation, sale, long-term lease were considered 
as ways out to the problem.   
 
The present users of a property decided for reinstatement would be able to 
continue to use the property for their own purposes for up to three years.  
 
On the conditions where a Turkish Cypriot built or restored a residence, 
apartment or an office on an old Greek property or land, in other words on the 
conditions of significant improvement, then the concerned individual shall apply 
the title deed of the land from the Property Board. If the value of significant 
improvement is more than the land the concerned land will be given to the 
Turkish Cypriot. However, the Turkish Cypriot shall pay the value of the land 
to the old owner. On the other hand, according to the Annan Plan, when 
determining value of improvement ‘market value’ and when determining value 
of a land, ‘current value’ measurements will be taken into consideration. In 
other words, a Turkish Cypriot’s improvement will be appraised according to 
Northern Cyprus market, and a Greek Cypriot’s old property will be appraised 
according to the South Cyprus market. Therefore, since the property values are 
higher in Greek Cypriot market, buying a title deed would be impossible for a 
Turkish Cypriot. (The Annan Plan, p.101. article 14)  
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In order to buy equivalent property the value of the Greek property in 
north, should be 50% more than the value of Turkish property. If this value is 
higher, it is impossible to buy an equivalent property. (The Annan Plan, p.129, 
article 12) 
 
Since the evaluation of values of properties was made by ignoring the 1963 
and 1974 events (The Annan Plan, p.135), Turkish properties value less than the 
Greek properties. According to the ‘current value’ measurement in the Annan 
plan, a Turkish property in southern part costs 1400% higher than the Turkish 
properties in northern part. (The Annan Plan, p.135). 
 
Then again, according to the Plan, the number of Turkish Cypriots who 
would lose their lands is 60.000, and to provide them a settlement in Northern 
Cyprus would require at least 15.000 constructions of new houses. In addition to 
those, another 60.000 thousand people would lose their own properties, firms, 
restaurants and hotels due to the migration of Greek Cypriots to north. To 
summarize, 120.000 people among 200.000, would face difficulties, become 
homeless and unemployed (Hisarcıkoğlu, 2003:6).  
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3.5. What would happen if the Annan Plan was accepted?13 
 
If the Annan Plan had been accepted not only by the Turkish Cypriot side, 
but also by the Greek Cypriots side on the 24th April 2004 referendum what 
would have happened? 
 
First of all, TRNC would have been abolished and in place “United 
Republic of Cyprus” would have made its 4th year. So, according to the Plan, on 
13th June 2004, two states’ federate deputies, senators, and EU deputies would 
have been chosen for the “United Republic of Cyprus”. The presidency 
committee of the federal parliament would have composed of 9 members in 
total; 4 Greek and 2 Turkish permanent members who would have also the right 
to vote and 3 members; 1 Turkish, 2 Greek who would have the right to vote. 
Since the duty of the presidency committee way to be 5 years, in a year later the 
elections were going to take place. Stage by stage, return of lands would have 
continued from Turkish side to the Greek Cypriots. Approximately 20,000 Greek 
Cypriots would have returned to their previous lands or homes. At the same 
time, return of the Greek Cypriots who had accepted living under Turkish 
Cypriot authority would have been started. 
                                                 
13 This part consists of information based on a summary of Prof. Ata Atun’s book: Kιbrιs Εksenli 
Siyasete Akademik Alarga. Vol.2 
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Since Greek Cypriots would have participated in the elections of Senate in 
North Cyprus, and possibly would have elected a Greek Cypriot, As a result the 
equality in the Senate would have eventually broken down (The Annan Plan, 
page 29, article 22) 
 
In addition, only 45,000 of the settlers from Turkey would have been 
allowed to stay. The rest of them would have been forced to turn back to 
Turkey. 
 
Greek Cypriots who were the owners of property before 1974 would have 
had a right to get back their properties in three to five years. Since all of them 
would not have been able to take back their properties, they would have gained 
the right to take compensations.  
 
In 4 villages in the Karpaz region, without any limitations, the Greek 
Cypriots would have settled down and gained political autonomy.  
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Collaboration between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in all sectors would 
have been commenced and probably as being more powerful in terms of 
economic structure. The pressures from the Greek Cypriot state would have 
been felt. Turkish Cypriots four times being immigrants, when returned to their 
own properties in the South would have found them as expropriated or ruined. 
Because of this, and because of not being able to return, and know what to do, 
disputes between the Greeks coming to North would have been started. In 
Greek local courts regarding compensations probably decisions against Turks, 
and in Turkish local courts probably decisions against Greeks would have been 
taken which would have created chaos uneasiness through the island. 
 
Due to the demilitarization program both RMMO (Greek National 
Guardsmen Army) and GKK (Turkish Security Forces commandership) would 
have been dissipated. According to the Annan Plan almost all of the Turkish 
Troops were going to be withdrawn by now. Only 6000 left. 
 
There would have been a great tension between two communities due to 
the law trials which were opened against Turks since they used Greeks houses 
since 1974. According to the last arrangements 1/3 of the Greek property would 
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have been given back but 2/3 of them would have started to take their 
compensation back. 
 
Since there were not enough number of Turkish personnel who had taken 
courses that compatible to EU norms most of the strategic governmental 
vacancies would have been filled by Greek Cypriots. This means that briefly the 
new Republic of United Cyprus would have been ruled by Greeks. Because of 
this situation chaos would have led some Turkish Cypriots to immigrate abroad.  
 
Although the application of the Annan plan would have reduced not only  
the size of the Turkish land to %28  from holding %37 but also include losing a 
fertile land Guzelyurt (Morphou), which would have created difficulties for 
Turkish economy (Dodd, 2006:2), the Turkish Cypriots had accepted the Annan 
Plan’s approval and almost for the first time in its history, materialized very 
large demonstrations for the acceptance of the Annan Plan. 
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3.6. Current Developments Aftermath of the Annan Plan 
 
As of today, no efforts have been successful in bringing Cyprus issue to a 
conclusion yet and the settlement since 1974 continues as it was. 
 
Recently, TRNC government wants to find a solution and tries to persuade 
the Greek side to come to an agreement.  The objective of Turkish side is no 
more than to come to an agreement providing the equal status that the 1960 
treaties envisage. Unfortunately, the negative attitudes of the international 
community towards Turkish community haven’t changed yet.  
 
As of today, after Talat and Christofies met on 21st March 2008, it was 
decided to set working groups and technical committees. These committees and 
working groups were planned to be directed by Ozdil Nami, who is a deputy 
from CTP, and President Talat’s assistance on this subject. And by Yakovu from 
the Greek side. 
 
The working groups and committees got together on the 18th and started 
meetings on the 22nd of April 2008. 
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President Talat informed the civilian community associations related with 
the working groups and committees. The following is a summary of the 
information giving by President Talat: 
1. One of the basic principles that we mutually agreed with the 
Greek part are that these working groups will not be able to make 
negotiations. Only Leaders will be in charge of negotiations. 
2. These working groups will take pictures of the current situation of 
both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides. After this investigation, 
the possible alternatives that can be produced will be discussed. 
3. The technical committees will also try to analyse matters about 
daily life. All discussion and bargaining that takes place between the 
technical committees, will be applied only after the leaders’ approval. 
 
President Talat as an answer to a question explained the red lines of the 
Turkish Cypriots as having: 
1. Political equality 
2. Two founding states’ with equal status. (but he did not explain 
what kind of a status it will be) 
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3. Virgin birth formation. That is to say that new state to be 
established will not be the continuation of RoC. It will be a new state but 
at the same time not brand-new. It will carry elements of both of the two 
states.  
 
On the other hand the red lines stated by the first president Denktaş and 
shared by the majority of the public include: (according to the latest public 
surveys %65 of public is in favour of presence of two equal people and two 
states. And at the same time %98 of people in Turkish side are in favour of 
presence of Turkish soldiers on the island.)  
1. Two equal, sovereign states 
2. Two sovereign states’ equality (even in case of a treaty, TRNC’s 
name, adjective and with its symbols should constitute the Turkish side.  
3. Through law, restriction of undiluted two-sides, freedom of 
movement, freedom of settlement rights and on these points, taking 
permanent derogations from EU as undivided whole. 
4. Continuation of Turkey’s active and de facto existence. (Including 
one-sided right of intervention and to update the level of forces of 
Turkish and Greek soldiers). 
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5. In case of a treaty, acceptance of EU law at first hand, an 
agreement which would not be a trial subject in EU and international law 
institutions. 
6. Complete realization of the Turkish Cypriot side’s EU membership 
with the same timing of Turkey’s full membership (until that time 
accommodation to EU works should be carried on parallel with Turkey. 
7. Integrity of a solution. (Pieces of solution should be avoided). 
8. The probable agreement should be approved by the referendums 
which will be hold in both parts. 
9. The proprietorship should be globally taken into hand and solved 
with compensation and exchanging. 
 
Currently, after several months of working groups and technical 
committees efforts the leaders got together to start negotiations process on the 
3rd September 2008.  
 
It is interesting to ask how an issue can be discussed through generations 
when international community, international organizations and governments 
come together periodically make meetings, but the same issue never gets 
resolved. Sometimes, in some cases where there are international issues, main 
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parties see some benefit from the status quo, by not solving the problems.  Here, 
in the case of Cyprus, the fact that only one side needs negotiation, whereas the 
other side has no intention; this fact naturally brought about the result of failure 
of agreement. This situation has been going on for years. 
 
The Turkish and the Greek Cypriots have been negotiating more than 40 
years and no agreement is reached yet. One of the most important reasons for 
not having any settlement in the process of the UN talks on the Cyprus issue is 
the resolution 186 taken by the UN Security Council on the fourth of March 
1994.  By this resolution, the collapsed Republic and the government of Cyprus 
were presented as if it existed and the Greek Cypriots were given the right to 
possess this status. Since then, the Greek Cypriots have obtained the status of 
being the legal owner and the representative of the Republic of Cyprus, whereas 
the Turkish Cypriots have become the rebellious minority which rose up and 
separated from the local central government. Being irrelevant to the essence of 
the Cyprus issue, “Settling down the problem” has become almost impossible 
on this basis. In other words, the Greek Cypriots’ so-called membership to EU as 
the representative of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ has brought the issue to the dead 
end. 
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The referendum result indicated two facts: first, without the consent of 
parties no agreement could be reached, and second if any solution are to be 
argued, the recognition of TRNC should be at first step, because unless the 
international community accepts the equality of Turkish Cypriots people with 
Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot side will never have any incentive for 
compromising with the Turkish Cypriot people. Thus the future of the island 
strictly will depend on the international actors concerning the Cyprus Conflict 
(Balcı, 2004). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SCENARIOS 
 
 
4.1. A Brief History of Conflict in Kosovo and Its Relevance for Turkish 
Cypriots 
 
One of the possible scenarios for the future of conflict in Cyprus and its 
resolution is the unilateral declaration of independence and the universal 
recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. One very typical case 
to discuss such a scenario is that of Kosovo. In the text of Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence that had been signed by the prime minister, Hashim Thaci and 
the president Fatmir Sejdiu, independence is stressed to be the result of a 
determination on the part of MPs to “give our people clarity about their future, 
move beyond the conflicts of the past and realize the full democratic potential of 
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our society”14. In order to analyze why independence in the case of Kosovo is 
the sole means to reach these goals and to compare it with the case of Cyprus, 
looking at the history of the region in terms of the existence of self rule and the 
characteristics of the relations between ethnic groups living in the region, 
namely the Albanians and the Serbs as well as the motivations of the third 
parties in either supporting the status quo or proposing change, will be the 
focus of the following paragraphs. As the sentence above indicates, one of the 
targets of this unilateral declaration of independence is the actualization of the 
potential of democracy in the country which makes it necessary to discuss why 
independence rather than coexistence is the only road to reach this target. This 
will mainly be related to the literature about the relationship between ethnic 
conflict and democracy. John Stuart Mill (1951) indicates that a consolidated 
democracy is “next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities”. Apart from the structural barriers such as the political 
misrepresentation of one group, in the contexts of ‘different nationalities’ or 
ethnic groups that are in conflict, the concreteness of the psychological barrier 
has to be taken into consideration. Olgun defines this psychological or 
behavioral barrier in Cyprus as “the amount of mistrust in the Island, the deep 
crisis of confidence that exists” and argues that the history and effects of these 
                                                 
14
 Kosovo Declaration, Retrieved: 25/06/2008 from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249677.stm 
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barriers “need to be addressed and this cannot be addressed if, for example, one 
party claims that it represents the whole Island, including the Turkish Cypriots” 
(Ergun, 2000). What we talk about is a context where democratic cohabitation is 
decreasing rather than increasing the effectiveness of democracy due to the 
persistent imbalances in social, political and economic terms between the two 
communities and the constant violation of the rights of one group by the other. 
Blaming the suspicions of the party that constantly suffers from these 
imbalances as the reason for failure of negotiations is a biased argument which 
in fact does not fit into the democratic premises that are tried to be maintained.  
 
Compared to the case of ‘velvet divorce’ between these two ethnic groups 
in conflict, like in the case of Czech and Slovak groups in former 
Czechoslovakia, Kosovo case is a good example to reveal the legitimacy of the 
unilateral solutions whenever such a divorce seems to be impossible, which 
shows significant parallels with the justifications of TRNC for independence. It 
is necessary to take into consideration that the discourse of peaceful settlement 
of the conflict through dialogue within the existing status-quo culminates in the 
systemic discrimination of one side which violates the basic norms of both 
democracy and human rights. Apart from this ethnic conflict, how the 
experience of autonomous self government starting with the Ottoman Period, 
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continuing under the Yugoslavian regime, distinguishes the case of Kosovo 
from other secessionist cases which is another significant variable to discuss in 
terms of its relevance for the case of TRNC. The last but not least reason why 
Kosovo is an interesting case to study for the purposes of this thesis is that 
despite all the similarities with the case of Turkish Cypriots, in the international 
arena, most of the countries that refuse to recognize TRNC as a legitimate state 
for years have immediately acknowledged its legitimate status after its 
declaration of independence.  Thus, after the analysis of the similarities between 
Kosovo and TRNC, the target is to discuss the paradoxes about the recognition 
issue with respect to the Turkish Cypriots.  
 
The history of Kosovo with territorial autonomy will be read in terms of 
the insufficiency of this method to deal with the problems of deeply divided 
societies and how it carries within itself the seeds of higher instability. With 
these purposes, the target of the following paragraphs will be having a brief 
look at the history of Kosovo in terms of its relevance about the Cyprus question 
and why and how it provides an effective scenario to resolve ethnic conflict 
there.  
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In order to analyze the history of conflict in Kosovo, choosing different 
starting points are possible in accordance with the purposes of analyses. In this 
thesis, to stress the symbolic importance of the territory of Kosovo, especially for 
the Serbians, and the possible role of this symbolic importance plays in the road 
to violent conflict between Kosovar Albanians and Serbians, the starting point 
will be the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. After the Ottomans conquered Kosovo in 
1389, Turkish and Albanian people had started to be placed there and Serbs 
ceased to make up the majority of the population. As Malcolm (1998:58) 
indicates: 
It does make sense to regard the battle of Kosovo as an important 
turning point... And in any case, the significance of this battle to the 
Serbian people is not to be measured simply in terms of its political-
strategic consequences . . . but it has become a totem or talisman of 
Serbian identity, having a status unlike that of anything else in the 
history of the Serbs. 
 
As the Ottoman Empire started to control the Balkans, Albanian people 
replaced Serbs in the territories that are today known as Albania and Kosovo. 
The battle and such a replacement of the population is what are referred to as 
‘Kosovo myth’ in the hearts and minds of Serbian nationalists. The Albanian-
Serbian relations after the Ottoman rule and later on during the Balkan Wars are 
widely discussed in the literature regarding the history of conflict in Kosovo 
from different perspectives. The most important dates which culminated in 
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Albanians’ being in majority in Kosovo are 1690 and 1737 when the attacks of 
Austria-Hungarian Empire against the Ottoman territories ended up with 
failure. The Ottoman rule in the region continued for almost 500 years which 
ended up with the redefinition of the borders in the Balkans with the Treaty of 
Berlin in 1878. With this Treaty, Serbia and Montenegro and Romania became 
independent states. Thus, the reemergence of Serbia with Serbs as a separate 
ethnic group with a state of its own took place in 19th century (Klemencic, 1998: 
52-61). However, the newly established Serbian state annexed Kosovo only after 
the Balkan Wars and until then Kosovo continued to be the part of the Ottoman 
Empire. With the breaking of the Balkan Wars in 1912, the Turks started to be 
driven out of the region and the province of Kosovo was invaded by the Serbs. 
With the London Treaty in 1913, the province of Kosovo became part of Serbia. 
At that time, the population of Kosovo was predominantly Albanians who were 
Muslims and their dissatisfaction with the idea of being part of Serbia gave birth 
to the ideas of independence starting from that time onwards. Therefore, as 
Klemencic (1998:52) summarizes,  
 
Ethnic Albanians were not in favor of becoming part of Serbia and 
the urban classes of Kosovo Albanians had given birth to the idea of 
Albanian independence in the 19th century. They did not welcome the 
territorial arrangements resulting from the Balkan wars which 
resulted in the division of Kosovo from the newly created Albanian 
state by an international border. The Albanian desire to secede from 
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Serbia is therefore, not an aspiration born in the context of 
Yugoslavia’s breakdown in the early 1990s. The roots of mistrust 
between Serbs and Albanians run deep. Since 1913, when Kosovo 
was annexed by Serbia as a result of the Balkan Wars, the Albanians 
have desired escape from Serbian rule.  
 
After becoming part of Serbia, Kosovar Albanians started to be seen as a 
threat to the stability in the state which affected the policies of the Serbian state 
towards them and imprisonment or forced migration were some of the means 
adopted to deal with this ‘problem’. Still, these anti-Albanian policies in the side 
of the Serbian state did not change the composition of the population in Kosovo 
significantly and at the period of the establishment of the Yugoslavia, the ethnic 
balance there was not in Serbs’ favor. 
 
After the end of the World War I, some Ottoman and Austrian lands which 
were inhabited by Croats and Slovenes other then Serbs were added to the 
Kingdom of Serbs. This territory was renamed as Yugoslavia in 1929. Kosovar 
Albanians were not content with even their name’s being non-mentioned as the 
constituent populations of the state and they sent a petition to the League of 
Nations, declaring their demands to be included in Albania, which was rejected. 
Later during the World War II, Tito was supportive of a unified, autonomous 
Kosovo in the Yugoslavian state thanks to their contribution to the National 
Liberation Movement. The hostilities among the Albanian and Serbian part of 
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the population were not resolved after the World War II; on the contrary, as 
Kosovo remained to be integral to Serbia and to be governed from Belgrade, the 
tensions and polarizations amongst the society continued to increase.  The 
Kosovo Albanians were first harshly repressed by the Yugoslav government in 
1960s. However, despite of the gradual increase in the autonomy of Kosovo 
from being acknowledged as an autonomous region in 1946 to an autonomous 
province, under the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo continued to be 
part of Serbia while de facto being one of the federal units, with provincial 
authorities and a Federal Assembly.  
 
Finally, Kosovo was granted a Constitution of its own as well as a 
University and judicial institutions of its own as well as being acknowledged as 
an equal official unit with the other units in the Yugoslav Federal State. One of 
the arguments against secession and self determination as a way of managing 
conflict is the lack of having experienced with the process of governance and 
state formation which might end up with increasing tensions and violence 
among the society rather than peace. Significant experience of autonomy and 
self rule is one of the necessary conditions for declaring independence in order 
to eliminate such an option which is present in the case of Kosovo which is 
another relevant and important similarity between the two.  
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As Hudson summarizes, “Under Tito, Kosovo and Vojvodina were 
granted greater autonomous status by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, with 
considerable political power and near equality with the six republics that made 
up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Hudson, 1999). However, also, 
Alexander Rankovic’s period of repression until his being taken away from the 
position of being Yugoslav Interior minister by Tito, Kosovar Albanians again 
experiences a period of significant violations of human rights, harsh repression 
and discrimination (Beurmann, 2008:41-44).  
 
Another issue that became instrumental for the Serbian government to 
adopt repressive measures over Kosovo was the discourse about the bad 
treatment towards the Serbian minority in Kosovo (Klemencic, 1998:55).  
 
After Tito’s death, the demonstration of the Kosovar Albanians ended up 
with even more increase in enmity towards Albanians in Kosovo in the side of 
the Serbians. Things started to heat up as the Serbians started to “give notice 
that Serbs did not intend to be victims any longer, that Tito’s polices were going 
to be reversed, that past “mistakes” such as constitutional accommodations to 
the Albanians of Kosovo would be erased” (Rogel, 2003:167-182). It was under 
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these conditions that Slobodan Milosevic became the leader of the Serbian 
communists in 1987 by adopting such a discourse. Under these circumstances, 
in 1989, this autonomous status of Kosovo was annulled in order to strengthen 
the central Serbian control over the region which ended up the proclamation of 
‘Independent Republic of Kosovo’ in 1991.  
 
As Rogel (2003:173) indicates, “on 22 September 1991, when war was 
already in progress in Croatia, the Kosovars held a referendum on establishing a 
republic, an effort that met with overwhelming voter support. Thereafter school 
and university documents were stamped ‘Republic of Kosovo’.  Of course, none 
of these developments were acknowledged by Serbia”. In fact 1990s were the 
times of the emergence of the parallel institutions in Kosovo as a resistance to 
the Serbian rule, such as parliament, education or taxation mechanism, which 
was called “parallel society”.  
 
Therefore, when we come to 1990s, things turned out to be getting even 
worse in Kosovo since “difficult issues that began to escalate in the 1980s 
developed into serious problems for the continued stability of the area and, 
finally, reached the boiling point near the end of the decade” (Ramet, 1999). The 
Dayton Peace in 1995 after the Bosnian War ended up with worsening of the 
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conditions of Kosovar Albanians rather than improving since the pacifist and 
non violent strategy culminated in their status’ not being seriously considered 
by the international authorities. With the recognition of Serbia and Montenegro 
and Kosovo as its part, the pacifist policies started to be replaced by more 
militaristic measures with the establishment of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo. In fact the 
establishment of them dates back to the period before the war, not after it but 
still during the peace talks the indifference about the conditions of Kosovar 
Albanians itself became one of the reasons that led to the increasing tension and 
violence. When the potential threat to the civilian lives in Kosovo was finally 
recognized, the already established conflict management mechanisms were “no 
longer sufficient to restrain the Serbian and Yugoslav security forces and led to 
the three month war of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against 
Yugoslavia, while the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities engaged in a ferocious 
campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population” (Bieber, 2003:1). 
The most commonly known of these events of mass killings is the Racak 
Massacre of 1999 which finally convinced the international peace building actors 
about the necessity of taking some measures in the region in order to protect the 
autonomy of the Kosovar Albanians. 
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Due to all these reasons, Kosovo can be argued to be providing a 
significant case about the possible outcomes of sidelining the conditions of a 
certain group seeking independence in the part of international institutions.  
 
When this is applied to the Cyprus question, especially about the question 
of European Union membership and UN initiatives for resolving conflict in the 
region, the Kosovo case provides a ‘through the looking glass’ (Chesterman, 
2001) case which clearly shows the results of a scenario that is written without 
taking into consideration the sensitivities of the Turkish Cypriots. Kosovo had 
been under the trusteeship of the United Nations since the ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ of NATO in 1999 until the declaration of independence. Thus, it is 
possible to talk about the existence of a state building experience in Kosovo 
independent from Serbia which is a case that has a lot in common with the case 
of Turkish Cypriots. The independence of Kosovo can be read as a case of how 
the policies of suppression might not end up with the results that are expected. 
These policies can be traced to the period of Milosevic starting with the Dayton 
Agreement in 1995.  The measures taken in the part of the EU to prevent armed 
conflict in the region has been weak although the high possibility of such a 
conflict was acknowledged to be high.  
65 
 
Then, after the war broke out in 1999, the casualties were as such: “Up to 
10.000 or so Kosovar Albanians died at Serb hands, mostly innocent civilians, 
thousands more were raped or otherwise brutalized. Some 800.000 people were 
forcefully expelled from Kosovo and hundreds of thousands more were 
displaced within the territory” (Daalder, 2000:2). 
 
In the recognition of Kosovo as an independent European state, the 
contribution of these scenes of violence experienced by the Kosovar Albanians 
cannot be rejected. Self determination as the sole solution for managing the 
conflict among the two ethnic groups thanks to the barriers for coexistence has 
been recognized in the case of Kosovo at the end of such a historical 
background, the details of which have been discussed in this chapter. However, 
the international actors and Western states fail to show such kind of an 
understanding as they do to Kosovars to the Turkish Cypriots. Such a failure 
might be the result of their tracing the reasons of conflict to 1974 which means 
the origins of conflict are attributed to a single third actor rather than being the 
end result of the internal dynamics of the cleavages among the deeply divided 
groups.  
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However, the role of this third party, which is Turkey, was not intervening 
to an otherwise non-conflictual dialogue between the parties. On the contrary, in 
1974, she played the role of the guarantor of security and peace based on non-
discrimination of the minority group since “a power-sharing pact in itself is 
often insufficient for peace: it requires a combination of a power-sharing pact 
and a third party security guarantee.” (Jarsad 2007:229)  As Jarsad (2007) 
indicates, in Cyprus of that time “the majority abolished the power-sharing 
arrangements, thus spurring a vicious circle of ethnic violence and segregation 
that resulted in an ethnically divided and de facto partitioned state” (Jarsad, 
2007:229). In other words, this failure in adopting the true, not short-sided lenses 
to analyze the Cyprus issue makes it impossible for the states that do not 
recognize TRNC to see the parallels between the cases of Kosovo and Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
 
As the discussion above about the history of conflict in Kosovo and its 
relevance for the Cyprus case indicates, recognition of Kosovo without doing 
the same for the Turkish Cypriots can be attributed to such a biased perspective 
which is already the derivative of the discourses of one side of the conflict. In 
other words, in Cyprus, there is the same type of the ethnic conflict that we have 
discussed in the case of Kosovo and the scenario of internationally recognized 
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independence of TRNC is the most accurate and consistent way of managing 
conflict in the region. Thus, to sum up, the existence of enosis in the case of the 
Cyprus question and how Kosovo has been argued to be the orbit Serbian 
nationalists despite of the population’s being 90% Albanian, autonomy rather 
than independence, regardless of the level of autonomy, cannot be considered as 
a democratic solution where all groups are equally represented. As the events 
under the rule of Milosevic reveals, under the cases of autonomy, no matter how 
high this level of autonomy is and no matter how strong or international the 
guarantors of this autonomy are, especially under the circumstances of such a 
deep and long division among the groups, there is always the possibility that 
one group, which is the majority, declares the other as its orbit and resorts to 
discriminative and violent means towards the other. Under these circumstances, 
the declaration of independence’s being unilateral, as the Kosovo case reveals, is 
not a sufficient enough reason to refuse recognition for this state and waiting for 
a ‘violent divorce’ or looking for democratic ways to manage the conflict might 
end up with disastrous results. As Denktaş indicates: 
Let us review the declaration of the Greek leadership (Klerides): 
“Since the world recognizes us as a legal government without the 
existence of Turkish Vice President, Turkish ministers, Turkish 
members of the parliament, then why should we make concessions to 
the Turkish? They either do as we wish or leave”. They do not need 
to compromise. They were somehow afraid because of Kosovo; but 
when the US and Britain declared that Kosovo would be no example 
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to Cyprus, and that TRNC would not be acknowledged, they were 
relieved15. 
 
As it had been stressed in the words of Denktaş, the solutions without the 
recognition of independent Turkish Republic of North Cyrus, like in the case of 
Kosovo, will obviously end up with the ‘love or leave’ attitude of the Greek 
Cypriots who are encouraged with the non-recognition policies of other states 
and international or supranational actors. The particularities of the cases has to 
be taken into consideration, such as different historical backgrounds  to analyze 
the existing structural or psychological barriers for cohabitation and the 
methods to be proposed to deal with the conflict should take these 
particularities into consideration.  
 
In the literature about various ways of managing conflict, there are people 
who argue that democratic countries have to resort to democratic means to 
resolve the countries and the solutions proposed by aggressive means cannot be 
accepted as legitimate since they are suitable for autocratic regimes (Klicperova, 
1996). However, the events that led to the Turkish intervention in the case of 
TRNC and which third party by violation of the international treaties and by 
                                                 
15
 Denktaş Rauf, from his interview with Sulay Sütcü, (19th March 2008.) 
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resorting to violent measures made democratic tools insufficient to manage the 
conflict has to be discussed in detail before ending up with fast conclusions.  
 
The Annan Plan and the non-compromising attitude of the Greek Cypriots, 
which has been discussed in detail in relevant parts of this thesis, also gives 
enough reasons to be critical about the argument of Turkey’s being the 
aggressive party in resolving the conflict. Before making such arguments, it is 
necessary to reconsider why there was a need for guarantor states for the two 
ethnic groups living in Cyprus and the conditions why Turkey felt the necessity 
to actualize this role in the region. Moran’s description of the deeds of Makarios, 
the Greek Cypriot leader and the Archbishop of Cyprus in 1950, is very telling 
in that sense: “Makarios regarded the Turks in Cyprus as a decidedly alien and 
insignificant minority who should never have been given partnership status 
with the Greeks, as laid down in the 1960 constitution, a constitution he was 
determined to destroy.” (Moran, 1999:58-62).  
 
Although the sensitivities of the Turkish Cypriots as a derivative of all 
this historical baggage the effects of which are still very fresh, in fact the denial 
to act is the general attitude within EU (Neuwahl, 2000) The events in Kosovo 
which led to its independence that is recognized by the European states except 
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Serbia as well as USA reveals significant similarities with the Turkish Cypriot 
case and such a comparison between the two cases provides enough supports 
about the necessity to acknowledge the independent statehood of Turkish 
Cypriots. The massacres of the 1960s which are being told from the words of the 
eyewitnesses in Banamie’s article, ‘Cyprus’s Forgotten Turks’ (Nuray: 2002) 
which again shows parallels with the Kosovo case in terms of the level and 
characteristics of the relevant ethnic conflict. Thus, comparison of the two states 
which is recognized and which is not should make it necessary for the Western 
states to reconsider their biases about TRNC and why its recognition as a state is 
the sole means to resolve the conflict there.  
 
Also, as Mango indicates, in fact since 1970s, the two ethnic groups are 
experiencing democratic self rule in their ethnically homogeneous regions and 
there is no example of a peaceful turning back to a multiethnic unitary state. The 
case of Kosovo is also relevant here since such an attempt by international 
institutions have had disastrous conclusions. In his words, “There are no 
examples of the reconstitution of multiethnic societies, after these have broken 
up into separate ethnic components. True, the international community is trying 
hard to reconstruct multiethnic societies in Bosnia and Kosovo. But results have 
been meagre.” (Mango, 2000) 
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So far, the particularities of the conflict in Kosovo and its dominantly 
ethnic character have been discussed and what to learn from the case of Kosovo 
in order to end up with an effective scenario for conflict management in Cyprus 
have been questioned. For better comprehension of why this scenario should be 
the one to be adopted in the case of TRNC, discussing why other scenarios 
adopted in cases with different types of conflict are not appropriate might help. 
In order to that, the differences of these cases from that of Kosovo and why the 
applicability of certain scenarios that work in those contexts is not possible for 
managing conflict in Cyprus should be better analyzed. One of these cases, 
which are both very similar to and different from Kosovo and which are mostly 
referred to as cases of smooth separation and peaceful conflict management, is 
that of Montenegro. The main question to be answered regarding the 
Montenegro case in terms of the purposes of this thesis is that why 
independence of Kosovo and its recognition had been characterized with all 
these difficulties and sufferings when Montenegro that was seeking 
independence from the same country did not have to face all these burdens.  
 
In the following chapter, this question and the relevance of its answer for 
the Cyprus question will be discussed. 
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4.2. Serbia and Montenegro: A Case of Non-Ethnic Conflict and the Right of  
Self Determination: 
 
Having discussed the resistance against independence of Kosovo by 
Serbia and its refusing to recognize it as a separate state, a comparison with the 
case of Montenegro which was seeking independence from the same country 
and which did not have to face such a resistance might be useful to analyze the 
determinants that shape the characteristics and level of conflict and hence its 
resolution. Apart from having seceded from the same country, another 
similarity between the two cases is that Serbians are in minority in both of the 
countries which is a factor that increased the tension in the case of Kosovo. To 
analyze the difference between the attitudes of Serbia towards the demands of 
Kosovo and Montenegro, one should look at the particularities of the Kosovar 
and Montenegrin identity and how their relationship with Serbia is 
characterized. In the literature, there is a consensus about the fluidity of the 
distinction between Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities and hence it is in 
sharp contrast with the cases characterized by ethnic polarization and conflict. 
In other words, Montenegro and Serbia are more similar to each other in terms 
of their religion, culture and history. Still, leaving the analysis at the level of 
similarities and differences cannot give enough explanation about why 
73 
 
differences between Kosovo and Serbia turned out to be issues of conflict. At 
that level, the case of Turkish Cypriots more converge with that of Kosovo since 
the main problematic is the recognition of these differences and their rights of 
self determination rather than adaptation of violent or discriminative policies in 
order to assimilate or subordinate them. In order to clarify this point about the 
distinction between the cases of Kosovo and Montenegro and to answer which 
one of the scenarios is more suitable for TRNC, a brief look at the history of 
Montenegro and its conflict with Serbia might be useful.  
 
After the Battle of Kosovo that ended up with the defeat of the Serbs by the 
Ottomans, Montenegro declared its independence and it formed an alliance 
with Russia in case she had to confront Albanians and Ottomans.16 During the 
Balkan Wars, she fought against Ottomans as part of the Balkan League in 1912-
13 and she also fought with Serbia during the First World War. Later on it 
became part of the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes which was then 
known as Yugoslavia in 1929. Still, Montenegrins, although being part of the 
constituent members of the state, they were not mentioned in the name of the 
state. During the Second World War, Montenegro was invaded by Italians and 
in 1946 it became one of the federal, self governing units of Yugoslavia and 
                                                 
16
 Fur further information see http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/bravo/balkan1912.htm, Retrieved 10th 
June, 2008 
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finally it was recognized as a separate nation. Still, until Milosevic, Montenegro 
supported Serbia in the wars of 1991-1995. The Republic of Montenegro 
declared its independence from Serbia on June 2006 which was widely 
recognized, including Serbia and became a UN member. The primary phases of 
this road to independence can be traced in 1997 when Montenegro started to 
adopt more of an independent policy (Clement, 1999: 60) as the pro-Milosevic 
policies were put to end with the period starting with Djukanovic’s presidency. 
Djukanovic’s distancing himself from Milosevic could also be observed in his 
attitude towards Kosovo and de facto independent Montenegro’s receiving 
refugees from the region. As Milosevic tried to strengthen and enlarge the area 
of impact of the federal forces which would mean subordination of the 
Montenegrins who were in minority, Djukanovic attempted to replace federal 
forces with local ones (Gallagher, 2003:131-157).  
 
The Union of Serbia and Montenegro that was established by the Union 
Agreement signed in March 2002, was in fact targeting prevention of a further 
fragmentation of the former Yugoslavian Republics, especially Kosovo. Yet, it 
was followed by the independence of the Montenegro state and finally with the 
independence of Kosovo, as it had been discussed above. Still, the two cases are 
different from each other in terms of a very significant determinant which is the 
75 
 
existence of an ethnic conflict which plays a role in how peacefully conflict is 
managed and how easily secession and formation of an independent state is 
recognized. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, what is being referred is not 
two ethnically different groups. Rather, Montenegrins are distinguished from 
the Serbians not in cultural or religious terms like it is the case for Kosovo and 
Montenegro is a country that is “peopled by the Serbs but recognized an 
exceptional Montenegrin character” (Lyon, 2004:53). Hockeno and Winterhagen 
(2007:39) also stress the same point about this kind of particularity of the ‘ethnic’ 
conflict between Serbia and Montenegro by saying that: 
 
the Serbs and the Montenegrins, are closely linked by religion 
(Eastern Orthodox), language (Serbian), culture, and history. There is 
no majority people (Montenegrins 43 percent, Serbs 32 percent, 
Bosniaks 7 percent, Albanians 6 percent, Muslims 5 percent, Croats 1 
percent) and the ethnic Serb leadership, though nationalist, was not in 
a position to rally its people to go to war with Montenegrins, even if it 
had wanted to. 
 
Therefore, one of the important characteristics that have an impact on 
Serbian and Montenegrin relations is that both groups come from South Slavic 
origin. This means that there are cultural, religious and linguistic commonalities 
between the two which are important determinants that shape the face of the 
conflict between the two and the peaceful nature of it resolution. These shared 
characteristics and the past of friendly coexistence are relevant variables to take 
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into consideration while discussing the peaceful and mutually recognized 
independence of Montenegro although it was a unilateral declaration.  
 
Another case which is argued to be the best example of peaceful means to 
solve conflict is Czechoslovakia. However, the non-applicability of this case to 
Cyprus question makes it necessary to question the reasons why one party 
constantly rejects recognizing the independence of the other, which are in fact 
the same reasons why peaceful means ceased to be an option any more in 1974. 
To clarify the particularities of TRNC case in question, one method can be 
comparing the Kosovo case with that of Czechoslovakia. It was the lack of the 
dynamics that led to violent conflict in the former that allowed for a ‘velvet 
divorce’ between Czechs and Slovaks and such a comparison to figure out the 
specific variables that are in effect in the case of Kosovo but not Czechoslovakia 
will be the target of the following paragraphs. Then, the relevance of these 
variables for the TRNC case will be opened to discussion. 
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4.3. The Case of Czechoslovakia, the Road to the “Velvet Divorce” and 
Its Divergences from the Case of Cyprus 
 
Czechoslovakia as an independent state has been established in 1918, as 
the result of an attempt to transform different parts of the Habsburg Empire into 
democratic modern nation states and this experiment ended in 1992 with the 
split of the country into two independent states which are Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic. During these 74 years experience, violence means to solve the 
conflicts were not resorted to which is still being discussed in the conflict 
management literature as an ideal scenario. The term ‘velvet divorce’ also 
connotes to the peaceful environment and mutual agreement even at the stage 
of splitting into two. In the words of Ulc (1996:331), “Without a single nose 
bloodied, the two former spouses divided common property, hoisted flags, sent 
ambassadors to each other and took separate seats in the United Nations” 
(1996:331). The existence of such an example renews the belief in the possibility 
of peaceful and mutually agreed ways of dealing with ethnic conflicts but this 
Czech and Slovak case should not be generalized without understanding its 
particular determinants which might be non-existent in other cases. Therefore, 
to analyze its propensity towards mutual agreement among ethnic groups both 
to live together and to separate, it is necessary to study the story of 
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Czechoslovakia starting with its establishment to its splitting into two in a 
comparative manner. In order to discuss its relevance for the Cyprus case, 
comparing such a history with that of the Kosovar Albanians as it had been 
indicated above might help.  
 
During the period that is known as the first Czechoslovak Republic, until 
the time of being conquered by the Nazi forces during the Second World War, 
which is between the years 1918 and 1938, ethnic or religious identities in the 
two regions were no counterpart to the political affiliations. However, following 
the first free elections after the Second World War, in 1946, people in 
Czechoslovakia started to vote on the basis of their regional or ethnic concerns. 
This is mainly related to the experience of having an independent state between 
1939 and 1945, namely the Second Republic, in the part of the Slovaks (Hilde, 
1999:650).  
 
In 1938, to prevent a possible German invasion due to its demands about 
the German speaking Sudetenland within the borders of the country, 
Czechoslovakia was forced to give this area to Nazi Germany by UK and French 
forces, which is known as the Munich Crisis (Ben-Arie, 1990:431-446).  It was in 
this period when the connections between the Czech and Slovak regions started 
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to be loosened due to the de facto split of the Czechoslovak state into Slovak 
Republic and Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.  
 
In the period of Communism between 1948 and 1989 the post-war 
distinction was not totally gotten rid of the government of the country was left 
to a coalition government which became a federal republic, consisting of Czech 
Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist Republic, as it is told in the 1960 
Constitution. These autonomous republics had many functions and 
responsibilities related to the issues about their particular regions but like a 
typical socialist regime, the main decision making organ for both of the groups 
was the Communist Party. During this period of Soviet domination, the claims 
for reforms and political liberalization led to the events of 1968 which are 
generally known as the Prague Spring and which ended with the Soviet and 
other Warsaw Pact allies’ invasion of the country with the purpose of ending 
these reforms. One significant discussion in this period of reform was about the 
rights of the different national groups for self determination which can be 
argued to have a significant effect in the gradual splitting of the country into 
Czech and Slovak Republics. The Third Republic ended with the infamous non-
violent Velvet Revolution in 1989. Then, after the collapse of Communism, 
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between 1990 and 1992, Czechoslovakia was officially a federal democratic 
republic with Czech Republic and Slovak Republic as its constituent parts. 
 
In the period of Czechs and Slovaks establishing a common state, what 
brought them together was geographic proximity, similarities between the two 
languages and religious background of the people. In other words, compared to 
Yugoslavia, the linguistic, religious and cultural differences in Czechoslovakia, 
both being from Slavic origin, was very few. The 1920 Constitution establishing 
Czechoslovakia was establishing a unitary state with Prague as its center and a 
limited movement for autonomy took place in 1930s. Even under these 
circumstances, most of the Slovaks voted for living together (Stein, 2000). Thus, 
one can talk about the Czechoslovakia state as a ‘clean’ start, without the 
historical enmities such as in the case of Kosovo. In other words, in the 
Czechoslovak history, the territorial ambitions of one over the other or the third 
parties, which sharply differentiate it not only from the case of Kosovo but also 
from the case of Cyprus.  
 
Also, despite of the relative homogeneity of the populations in both of the 
regions, especially after the Third Republic, which is the name given to the post-
World War II period, still for example there was a Hungarian minority living in 
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Slovakia which did not pose a problem at the splitting or redefinition stage. 
However, in the case of Kosovo, the Serbian states claims and actions about the 
Serbian minority in Kosovo contributed a lot in the increase of violence in the 
region, which can be read as the significance of the attitude of the third parties 
and their territorial claims for the peaceful or violent characteristics of the split 
up or conflict management. Hence, in fact the origins of conflict between the 
two groups that finally led to splitting were in fact not ethnic but political and 
economic.  
 
Czech region was the developed one compared to Slovak one during 
Czechoslovakia and it was the union that was seen as responsible for this in the 
part of the Slovaks. The Czech part was biased as the suitable part for 
investment and for final production due to the high material and human cost in 
the Slovak part (Bookman, 1994:178) This was ending up with increasing in the 
level of economic discrepancy between the two regions since as Czech region 
was seen as more suitable for investment and as the Slovak region was 
negatively biased in terms of its propensity for development, this was ending up 
with a self fulfilling prophecy.  
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Under these circumstances, both regions believed in the benefits of 
splitting up, Czechs seeing the other as a burden, having to constant subsidize 
it, (Ulc, 1996:333) and Slovaks seeing the other as the main reason for economic 
backwardness. This is briefly what is known as the ‘Slovak Question’ in the 
literature. Although how to the split the existing state budget as well as the state 
debts became problematic due this question of who produced or consumed 
more or less, this never led to a violent conflict among the two groups and 
peacefully resolved. The level of international support is also a relevant 
determinant in the case of the redefinition and re-equilibration of the newly 
independent economies.   
 
In addition to that, compared to the autonomous stages of Kosovo 
changing from being an autonomous region to an autonomous province, 
Slovaks within Czechoslovakia were ensured about their separateness much 
more effectively and consistently than Kosovar Albanians. As Bookman 
(1994:176) stresses, “In the after- math of both unification in 1919, as well as 
federation in 1969, Slovaks were appeased with various measures ensuring their 
'separateness' within the context of a state”. Thus, the violations of human rights 
and the discriminatory policies that have been discussed in the case of Kosovo 
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are non-existent in the Czech and Slovak independence, which is a critical point 
to analyze in order to compare it with the case of Turkish Cypriots.  
 
The difference regarding the attitude towards the communist political elite 
in the two regions is also one of the issues that are being discussed with respect 
to the road to the Czech and Slovak divorce, which can be defined as ideological 
differentiation among the groups. The period after the crushing of the Prague 
Spring in 1968 is called the ‘normalization period’ and according to Eyal, this 
period has significant repercussions on the divorce of the two societies since the 
Czech part after this crashing of the non-violent revolution ended up with the 
development of more of an anti-communist sentiments in the part of the elite 
whereas Slovak elite was “more rooted in communist institutions” (Eyal, 2003). 
  
Hilde argues that such a division of political world views was not only 
true for the elites put also for the people, which continued after the Velvet 
Revolution in the shape of conflicts about the characteristics of the democratic 
institutions (Hilde, 1999:645).  
 
Another political determinant was the deadlocks caused by the veto right 
of the minority which was put in the 1968 Law on the Federation in order to 
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prevent the Slovaks from being governed by the Czech majority. Special 
majority system set with the purposes in question in fact ended up with the 
possibility of 30 MPs out of 300 to block the amendments which had significant 
consequences in the perceptions about the future of the Federation (Hilde, 
1999:645).  
 
All these economic and political concerns merged together in order to pave 
the way to the velvet divorce. Therefore, when we look at the national identities 
of the Czechs and Slovaks, it is possible to argue that it was more of a political 
rather than an ethnic identity. Hence, the type of nationalism has an impact on 
the characteristics of the demands of the different groups which also determines 
whether peaceful political means can be enough to solve the conflict. The Slovak 
and Czech nationalisms that were mainly consistent of the elements discussed 
above can be put under this category compared to the cases of other 
independent states of the post-communist era. Under these circumstances, 
secessionist nationalism was not a question; on the contrary, it can even be 
argued that the decision of breaking up was mainly belonging to the elite 
without being based upon any public support. The nationalism of the groups 
was defined as ‘autonomy nationalism’, meaning not necessarily looking after 
forming an independent state but rather looking for possible ways of reform in 
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the existent federal state (Hilde, 1999:453). It was the consensus on the failure of 
these reforms that ended up with the peaceful breakup of Czechs and Slovenes. 
In other words, “On the one hand there were feelings of solidarity, but on the 
other hand there was a growing recognition of the incompatibility of the 
political representatives of both Republics. These practical considerations clearly 
won out in the end” (Jean, 2003:40). In fact, these characteristics significantly 
differentiate the ‘Slovak Question’ from the Kosovo Question and these 
differences have to be taken into consideration at the stage of recognition. Same 
is true for the case of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
 
To conclude, the peaceful character of the ‘velvet’ divorce in the case of 
Czechoslovakia is very much related to the mostly economic and political 
characteristics of the conflict rather than ethnic as it is the case in Kosovo. In 
other words, when the two cases are compared, what can be observed is that the 
challenges that have to be faced are different which ends up with having 
different outcomes as far as the level of violence in the conflict and whether the 
final solution is a unilateral or mutual one is concerned.  
 
The ethnic characteristics of the conflict also consists of a particular 
challenge itself which is the role the ethnic groups outside the borders play and 
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whether they have any discourses about the territory of the conflicting groups. 
This variable can be named as ‘cross border ethnic affinities’ (Alker, 2001). Even 
the absence of this variable in the Czechoslovak case differentiates it from the 
case of Cyprus. In fact, even the enosis factor itself that is reincarnated as the 
negative attitude of the Greek side regarding any possible solutions that 
acknowledge the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, even at the minimum level, is a 
sufficient factor to be suspicious about the possibility of a solution based on 
mutual agreement like in the Czech and Slovak case. This enosis, in the words of 
Denktaş is such a strong determinant that even when it was banned by the 
international Agreements, it “demolished the partnership republic formed with 
International Agreements in 1960, acted towards genocide against its Turkish 
partner, blaming its Turkish partner with rebellion by saying “the constitution is 
“dead and buried”17. Therefore, comparing the Cyprus case with 
Czechoslovakia and trying to some up with similar mechanisms of conflict 
management in order to create a peaceful scenario for recognition does not fit 
the particularities of the region. The Kosovo case and the recognition of its 
independence despite its being unilateral deserves much more stress to end up 
with possible scenarios to solve the Cyprus question. 
 
                                                 
17
 Denktaş, Rauf. From his interview with Sulay Sütcü, (19th March 2008.) 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this dissertation, the Cyprus question and the problematic of the 
recognition of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent state 
have been discussed in terms of the history of the conflict, and possible 
scenarios. Through the detailed analysis of historical background of the island 
and comparing it with three different cases which are the independence of 
Kosovo, Montenegro and Czech and Slovak Republics, the possible outcomes of 
the resolution mechanism introduced by the Annan Plan has been questioned. 
In addition, the viability of other scenarios that may provide a better conflict 
management technique which can address to the expectations of not a single 
group but all and that can prevent the repetition of the conflict, perhaps in a 
more violent manner, has been brought into discussion. In order to answer all 
these questions, it has been argued that ‘ethnic conflict’ as a single category to 
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study the issues of tension between two ethnic groups is not a useful analytical 
tool without reference to the historical, geographical, social and political 
particularities of the different contexts of conflict.  
 
In other words, the problems which different inter or supranational 
institutions have in coming up with an effective conflict management 
mechanism without recognition of the independence of TRNC is a derivative of 
their failure of formulating the origins of the problems in the region. The Annan 
Plan had been put as an insufficient plan that introduced a scenario which failed 
to take into consideration the particularities of conflict in Cyprus itself is a 
manifestation of the problematic of proper formulation of the question that is to 
be resolved. In fact, ironically, although the Annan Plan failed to resolve the 
conflict, the attitudes of the Greek and Turkish sides regarding the applicability 
of the plan made the origins of the conflict more and more obvious through 
revealing how one side is never to be satisfied with a win-win scenario but 
considers it as a zero sum game and how recognition of independence, like in 
the case of Kosovo is the most effective and legitimate scenario. As Talat 
indicates, although Turkish side was aware of the significant problems in the 
plan, they accepted it by considering it as a starting point for discussing the 
Cyprus question in an international arena but:  
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fundamentally, the Greek Cypriots could not accept any power-
sharing formula with the Turkish Cypriots on equal terms. They 
could not tolerate it because they always saw themselves as superior. 
They are the ones that are rich, powerful, the ones from this planet. 
The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, were the Ottoman remnants, 
ignorant, incapacitated, poor, ordinary people; population-wise they 
were the minority. Therefore, they could not bring themsleves to 
accept a power-sharing formula on equal terms. Greek sociologists 
have conducted many studies in this field. They have studied the 
matter themselves , this is what they identify in their scientific 
researches. Consequently, Mr. Hristofias stated that in 1977, Makarios 
III made a great concession by accepting an agreement including the 
Turkish Cypriots’ managing the Greeks. Do you comprehend what he 
means? There is going to be a two-regioned state, the Turkish would 
manage the Greek living in the Northern part. Even this was a 
suffering for them. …Even Papadopoulos is someone having an 
ideology seeing all people as equal and brothers; and even he accepts 
it as a suffering for Greek Cypriots to be managed by the Turkish 
Cypriots. This is the reason why an agreement cannot be reached”18. 
  
Without the analysis of such an attitude of one group towards the other 
which is not only protected by Greece as a guarantor state but now with the 
entire EU which has accepted ‘Cyprus’ as a member, resolution of the conflict in 
a non biased manner is not possible. In order to come up with a scenario that 
will most effectively provide a resolution mechanism to manage the conflict in 
Cyprus, it is necessary to identify the particularities of different contexts and not 
to enforce one scenario with distinct components as a solution for a conflict that 
has no components in common with that. 
                                                 
18
 Talat, M. Ali. From his interview with Sulay Sütcü, (14.03.08) 
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In all the three cases discussed above, it is possible to observe a conflict 
between two ethnic groups but in the cases of Montenegro and Czechoslovakia, 
it has been argued that the conflicts were more of an historical, political, 
ideological, and/or economic in nature whereas in Kosovo only it is possible to 
talk about an ‘ethnic conflict’. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish ethnic 
conflict from other types of conflict and to stress that it is not simply any conflict 
that takes place between two ethnic groups. Wolff (2004:1,2) gives a detailed 
explanation of what ethnic conflict is and what makes it particular: 
 
…ethnic conflicts are a form of group conflict in which at least one of 
the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential 
remedies, along an actually existing or perceived discriminating 
ethnic divide. In practice matters are not that simple. Empirically, it is 
relatively easy to determine which conflict is an ethnic one: one 
knows them when one sees them …because their manifestations 
were/are violent and their causes and consequences obviously ethnic. 
On the other hand, the relationships between the different ethnic 
groups in post-Apartheid South Africa and the complex pattern of 
relationships between different linguistic and religious groups in 
India and Pakistan are also predominantly based on distinct ethnic 
identities and incompatible interest structures, yet their 
manifestations are far less violent, and it is far less common to 
describe these situations as ethnic conflicts. Rather, terms like tension, 
dispute, and unease are used. 
 
Both the case of Kosovo and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus fall into 
the first category which makes it necessary to have a better grasp of the process 
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that led to the declaration of independence for both with the exception that the 
former was mostly recognized in the international arena which is not the case 
for the latter. Therefore, the recognition of the independent status of Kosovo 
immediately after its declaration itself proves the thesis of this dissertation 
which is that only independence of TRNC can be accepted as an effective 
conflict settlement strategy under the conditions of ‘ethnic conflict’. The 
convergences with the Kosovo case and the divergences from other cases, as it 
had been discussed above in detail, reveal that the case of TRNC fits into the 
category of ethnic conflict where independence is the only way of resolving 
conflict and prevent the use of violence of one party over the other. 
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